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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 
COY RINGO, 9712 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant has appealed from a conviction for 
assault upon a fellow convict with malice aforethought in 
violation of Section 76-7-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried and convicted for committing 
an assault upon a fellow prisoner, while confined in the 
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Utah State Prison, upon jury trial in the Third Judicial 
District Court and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The state contends the appellant's conviction should 
be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state submits the following statement of facts in 
supplement to those set out in the appellant's brief as be-
ing directly applicable to the sole issue raised on appeal. 
The sole issue raised on appeal is that the oral admissions 
or confession obtained from the appellant, and introduced 
at trial, were obtained in violation of the appellant's State 
constitutional right against being compelled to give evi-
dence against himself. Article I, Section 12, Utah Consti-
tution. 
The record discloses the following pertinent testimony 
on the issue raised. Shortly after the assault by the ap-
pellant on Howard LeRoy Ollerdisse, the appellant was 
interrogated by Ferris D. Andrus, Salt Lake County Sher-
iff's Office, in the presence of Deputy Warden Fitzgerald, 
Ernest Wright, Executive Secretary of the Board of Cor-
rections, and Lieutenant Jooston of the prison staff. The 
interrogation took place in the office of the deputy warden 
on January 2, 1962, at about 1 :30 p. m. (R. 230). No force, 
threats or promises were made during the interrogation. 
Mr. Wright took notes of the interrogation, which lasted 
from 45 minutes to an hour (R. 235). The questions dur-
ing the interrogation were asked by Deputy Andrus (R. 
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i) 
241-242). At the outset of the interrogation, the appellant 
entered the room and stated : 
"Well, what are you going to ask me" (R. 242). 
Thereafter, Deputy Andrus indicated that he was just in-
terested in finding out what happened. The appellant then 
explained the motive for and admitted stabbing Ollerdisse 
with a laundry pin. No coercion of any kind appears in 
the record, and it further appears that the appellant's state-
ment was spontaneous and voluntary. However, the appel-
lant was in custody at the time the statement was given 
and was not warned of any right to remain quiet or to have 
counsel. It is the latter facts that appellant contends 
amount to constitutional violations. 
At the time of trial, when the above evidence was 
offered, counsel for appellant requested an out-of-court 
hearing as to the voluntariness of the statement (R. 230). 
After laying initial foundation, the district attorney of-
fered to complete the matter out of court (R. 231). The 
defense counsel then stated, "I withdraw the objection 
at this time." Thereafter, the statement of the appellant, 
as reported by Deputy Andrus, was admitted before the 
jury, and defense counsel cross-examined Andrus thereon. 
Thereafter, Ernest D. Wright was called and testified simi-
larly, without any objection to the testimony from defense 
counsel, and defense counsel cross-examined Mr. Wright 
on his direct testimony (R. 239-245). Subsequently, the 
appellant's opening statement was made and his witnesses 
and evidence presented. After the defense rested, the 
defense counsel made a motion to strike the testimony of 
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Officer Andrus and Mr. Wright on the grounds that it was 
not voluntary (R. 292). The motion was denied (R. 293). 
No instructions on the question of voluntariness were re-
quested nor exceptions taken to the failure of the court to 
submit the matter to the jury (R. 298, 312-330). No issue 
is raised on appeal concerning the court's actions in this 
regard. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM AS 
TO THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HIS STATE-
MENT OR ADMISSIONS AT THE TIME OF 
TRIAL. 
It is submitted that the appellant waived any claim 
he may now have as to the voluntariness of his statement 
by conduct at trial. Generally, the court should allow a 
defendant an out-of-court hearing on the voluntariness of 
any confessions. State v. Braasch, 119 U. 450, 229 P. 2d 
289 (1951); State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 142 P. 2d 178 
(1943). Such a procedure, to establish preliminary volun-
tariness, is not necessary if the statement merely amounts 
to an admission. Thus, in State v. Masato Karumai, 101 
U. 592, 126 P. 2d 1047 ( 1942), the court stated: 
"Although there are some cases to the con-
trary, the great weight of authority and the better-
reasoned cases hold that before receiving an admis-
sion-as distinguished from a confession-in evi-
dence, it is not necessary that a preliminary show-
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ing be made to the effect that the statement was 
voluntary." 
The statements given in the Masato Karumai case are 
similar to those of the instant case where the court was of 
the opinion that they were merely admissions. The court 
said: 
"In the statement testified to there was no ex-
press adn1ission of the guilt of any crime of which 
defendant was charged. Construed against defen-
dant in its strongest possible light, it was, at most, 
merely an admission that the defendant killed the 
deceased because deceased was no good. On the 
other hand, it might well be taken to mean that 
the defendant merely asserted that the deceased 
was no good, without ad1nitting the killing or offer-
ing a reason therefor. Even if taken as an admis-
sion that the defendant killed the deceased because 
deceased was no good, this does not admit that the 
killing was done with a criminal intent" ( 105 Utah 
at 602). 
However, even so, it is well established that before 
error may be claimed, a contest must have been raised. 
State v. Mares, 113 U. 255, 192 P. 2d 861 (1948). In the 
instant case, defense counsel expressly withdrew his ob-
jection to the testimony of Deputy Andrus. As to Mr. 
Wright, no objection to his testimony reciting the accused's 
statements was voiced. Not until after full cross-examina-
tion of the state's witnesses, and presentation of the de-
fense, was any objection voiced. This was in the nature 
of a motion to strike after the full testimony had, with ap-
pellant's express consent, been placed before the jury. No 
effort was made to have the appellant testify out of the 
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hearing of the jury as to the voluntariness of the state-
ments, nor were instructions requested by the appellant on 
the issue. The general rule is stated in Abbott, Criminal 
Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 348: 
"It is a general rule that, in order to take ad-
vantage of the admission of evidence by the trial 
court as error and to secure a reversal of its judg-
ment upon appeal, the evidence must be objected 
to in the trial court." 
Sec. 351, ibid.: 
"Any objection to the admissibility of evidence 
is waived by failure to object thereto. If defendant 
fails to object to evidence when first offered, he 
waives its incompetency." 
Sec. 352, ibid. : 
··A party who has allowed obviously incompe-
tent evidence to be received without objection is not 
entitled to have it stricken out, but at most to have 
the jury instructed to disregard it." 
It is submitted, therefore, that the appellant's express 
withdrawal of his objection to Deputy Andrus's testimony, 
his failure to object to the testimony of Mr. Wright, his 
belated motion to strike and his failure to request an in-
struction to the jury waived any claim of error. 
Further, since the appellant offered no evidence, nor 
sought to place the matter before the jury, no complaint 
could be had. In State v. Dunkley, 85 U. 546, 39 P. 2d 1097 
( 1935) , a claim of improper admission of a confession was 
based on the failure to allow the appellant to see counsel. 
No issue, however, was joined at trial. The court stated: 
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"* * * The matter, for what it is worth, 
ought to have been put before the jury. But since 
the defendant did not offer to do so, nor offer any 
evidence before the jury bearing on the question 
of voluntariness, we think the defendant is not in 
position to complain." 
It is submitted, therefore, no claim of error is prop-
erly before the court. 
POINT II 
THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF THE 
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION UNDER 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH CON-
STITUTION. 
The appellant contends that the circumstances of his 
questioning by prison officials and members of the sher-
iff's office, and the resulting admissions made by him 
occurred in violation of his state constitutional rights 
against self incrimination. The appellant's contention is 
based upon the facts that the appellant was in custody at 
the time of the interrogation, and at that time was not 
advised of his rights to counsel, nor advised that he need 
not say anything incriminatory. On the other hand, there 
is no showing in the record that the appellant ever asked 
for counsel and was refused, or that he was unaware of 
his rights. Additionally, it appears that no coercion, force, 
threats, or promises were made to the· appellant to induce 
the admissions, nor was the appellant a person of immature 
age or experience. Finally, appellant was only interrogated 
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a comparatively short time and appeared to respond to 
questions with complete spontaneity. 
There is no mandatory constitutional requirement that 
a suspect be afforded counsel at an interrogation, nor that 
he be advised of a right to counsel or warned of making 
any incriminating statement. The absence of a warning 
as to these matters may, however, be a factor in determin-
ing whether or not a confession or admission so obtained 
was in fact voluntary. State v. Masato Karumai, supra. 
The essential question is: Was the confession voluntary? 
It is the evidentiary consequences of appellant's confession 
or admissions with which the court is in fact concerned. If 
the confession is voluntary, the absence of counsel or warn-
ing and the fact of custody are all immaterial. If the con-
fession was involuntary, the evidence should have been ex-
cluded, and the admission of the confession would be re-
versible error. Maguire, Evidence of Guilt (1959), Chap. 
3, and especially Section 3.07. Therefore, before reversal 
is in order, it must appear that the confession or admis-
sions of the appellant were involuntary as a matter of law 
because of the deficiencies complained of on appeal. Fur-
ther, appellant must bear the burden in this respect. 
The facts relied on by the appellant and those appar-
ent from all the circumstances must be considered in de-
termining whether the appellant's statement was voluntary. 
Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156, 185 (1953). The appel-
lant contends that the facts of the instant case give rise to 
a mandatory conclusion that appellant's confession or ad-
missions were involuntary, and relies upon a federal dis-
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States v. Kallas, 272 Fed. 742 (D. C. Wash. 1921). It is 
the position of the state that the Kallas case does not stand 
for the position urged by the appellant, is not the general 
federal rule, is somewhat contrary to the applicable federal 
cases, and is inconsistent, to the extent it may be claimed 
as applicable in this case, with decisions of the Utah Su-
preme Court. 
The Kallas case must be viewed in light of the circum-
stances surrounding the decision. The case involved an 
application for a writ of habeas corpus to which the 
United States Attorney merely filed demurrer. The court 
had nothing before it but the bear facts of the petition and 
a record of hearing before a United States Commissioner. 
The petition claimed that the evidence before the United 
States Commissioner, upon whose order he was being de-
tained for the grand jury, was insufficient to warrant 
detention. The petition alleged that the only evidence of 
wrongdoing was contained in certain statements he made 
to a government investigator while confined for investiga-
tion. There was no evidence before the commissioner of 
the crime except the claimed confession, which in the ab-
sence of a corpus would not suffice in any event to detain 
the accused. The court then by dicta indicated that a warn-
ing while in custody should be given, saying it was the 
"safer course." What the court was in effect saying was 
that such circumstances may be of a compelling nature, but 
the court merely overruled the demurrer, thus requiring 
proof of voluntariness. That the case is not authority to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
support a conclusion that detention and absence of a warn-
ing of an accused's constitutional rights requires a finding 
of voluntariness can be found from other federal cases 
commenting on the Kallas case.1 Thus, in United States 
V. Lydecker, 275 F. 2d 976 (D. C. N. Y. 1921), the peti-
tioner made a claim contending the indictment against him 
should have been quashed for failure to warn him of his 
rights and because the confession was taken while the 
petitioner was in custody. Petitioner relied on the Kallas 
case. The court stated: 
"The case of U. S. v. Kallas (D. C.) 272 F. 742, 
does not support defendant's broad contention." 
The court further noted : 
"* * * it is ruled that the fact that an ac-
cused was in custody does not render his confession 
involuntary, nor is it necessary that he should have 
been warned that what he said would be used 
against him. It is sufficient if the confession was 
voluntarily made, though he was not warned or ad-
vised that he had the right to remain silent. Not to 
have had the aid of counsel, or that the confession 
was made to an officer while in custody, or drawn 
out by cross-questioning put to the accused and that 
Pinkerton detectives and other police officers were 
called in to assist in the questioning or to be pres-
ent, or that he was confined in the police station 
and on the next day requestioned, are all matters 
bearing upon his asserted involuntary statement." 
Thus, the court recognized that question of custody 
and warning went only to the weight of the evidence in 
lAdditionally, a reading of the Kallas case shows the judge to he confusing 
the question of procedural correctness which relates also to self incrimination 
with that of due p~ocess based on compeHed evidence. 
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determining voluntariness and did not per se render the 
confession involuntary. It is submitted, therefore, the 
Kallas case is no precedent for the contention broached by 
appellant. 
Additionally, the Kallas case would be contrary to the 
holdings of other subsequent federal cases and with deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court if the interpre-
tation urged by appellant were adopted. 
In Wilson v. United States, 163 U. S. 613 (1896) the 
United States Supreme Court noted: 
"In short, the true test of admissibility is that 
the confession is made freely, voluntarily and with-
out compulsion or inducement of any sort." 
The defendant in the Wilson case was in custody, be-
fore a magistrate who questioned him without warning him 
of his rights, nor allowing him counsel. The court noted : 
"And it is laid down that it is not essential to 
the admissibility of a confession that it should ap-
pear that the person was warned that what he said 
would be used against him, but on the contrary, if 
the confession was voluntary, it is sufficient though 
it appear that he was not so warned." 
The court then went to the facts of the case and noted: 
"It is true that, while he was not sworn, he 
made the statement before a commissioner who was 
investigating a charge against him, as he was in-
formed; he was in custody but not in irons; there 
had been threats of mobbing him the night before 
the examination; he did not have the aid of counsel, 
and he was not warned that the statement m~ght 
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be used against him or advised that he need not 
answer. There were matters which went to the 
weight or credibility of what he said of an incrim-
inating character * * * They were not of 
themselves sufficient. to require his answers to be 
excluded on the ground of being involuntary as a 
matter of law." 
It is noteworthy that the judge who presided in Kallas 
did not refer to the Wilson opinion; apparently he was un-
aware of it. 
In Powers v. United States, 223 U. S. 303 (1912), the 
defendant was arrested on the charge of murder. He was 
taken before a United States Commissioner. The defen-
dant, in custody, was also without counsel, and was not 
warned of his rights. The record otherwise showed the 
defendant "voluntarily" testified to the crime before the 
commissioner. The court held the evidence admissible, 
holding: 
"We are of the opinion that it was not essential 
to the admissibility of his testimony that he should 
first have been warned that what he said might be 
used against him." 
The court cited the Wilson case as valid precedent for its 
conclusion. 2 
Additionally, the lower federal courts have also fol-
~owed policies that are not compatible with the broad con-
cept espoused by appellant. In Gerard v. United States, 
61 F. 2d 872 (7th Cir. 1932), the accused made a statement 
2The Wilson case, as well as the Powers case, was cited with approval in 
United States V. Carignan, 342 U. S. 3 6, 41 (1951), which allowed ad· 
mission of a confession while in custody and without counsel. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
while in custody and without having been advised of his 
rights. Also, he obviously was without counsel. The court 
said, in rejecting a contention of error: 
"Appellant further contends that there was 
error in refusing to strike and exclude the testimony 
of the arresting officers relative to appellant's de-
nial of the facts that he was acquainted with Cohen 
and Spivak, that he purchased the plates, and that 
he was ever in Spivak's car. He bases this conten-
tion upon the fact that the officers failed to advise 
him, while he was under arrest and in their custody, 
that any statement he might make to them might 
be used against him, and that he was under no 
obligation to make any statement. There was no 
duress proven, and this contention is without merit. 
Powers v. United States, 223 .U. S. 303, 32 S. Ct. 
281, 56 L. Ed. 448; Wilson v. United States, 162 U. 
S. 613, 16 S. Ct. 895, 40 L. Ed. 1090." 
In Wood v. United States, 128 F. 2d 265 (D. C. Cir. 
1942) , the court said : 
"* * * The only bar arises when compul-
sion destroys the confession's probative value. Con-
fessions, it is said, do not become involuntary be-
cause elicited by questions, or made while the con-
fesser is under arrest, or in the absence of counsel, 
without warning or caution that the statement may 
be used against him, nor by the concurrence of all 
these conditions in a single case. Admittedly these 
principles apply when the statement is not made in 
the course of judicial proceedings." 
See also Himmelfarb v. U. S., 175 F. 2d 924 (C. A. 9th, 
1949); Anderson v. United States, 124 F. 2d 58 (6th Cir. 
1941). 
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Many federal district court cases have reached similar 
results. U. S. v. Papworth, 156 F. Supp. 842 (D. C. Tex. 
1958), cert. den. 358 U. S. 854; U. S. v. Wheeler, 172 F. 
Supp. 278 (D. C. Pa. 1959) 3 ; United States v. Simpson, 162 
F. Supp. 677 (D. C. DC 1958). The latter case is especially 
relevant to the instant claim. In the Simpson case, the de-
fendants were members of the Air Force. They were 
brought by an air policeman to the Provost Marshal, where 
they were interrogated by the F. B. I. in the presence of 
military officials. Counsel was not present nor were the 
accused advised or warned of their rights. A factor, not 
present here, also complicated the issue in the Simpson 
case in that Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
10 U. S. C. 831, makes mandatory the advising of a mili-
tary accused of his rights before any evidence may be used 
against him in a court martial. Under these circumstances, 
the court held the confession properly admitted, finding 
that they were not thereby rendered involuntary where 
other evidence disclosed no duress and that "no physical 
force was employed and * * * no mental coercion and 
no promises." 
It must be concluded that the federal cases, including 
that of Kallas, do not favor appellant's contention. Nor do 
the authorities from other jurisdictions. State v. Evans, 
345 Mo. 398, 133 S. W. 2d 389 (1939); People v. Pongetti, 
72 C. A. 2d 749, 165 P. 2d 479; People v. Tipton, 48 Cal. 
2d 389, 309 P. 2d 813; State v. Preis, 89 Ariz. 336, 362 P. 
aAffirmed 275 F. 2d 94. 
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2d 6604 • Therefore, appellant must find support from de-
cisions in this state if he is to succeed. 
An analysis of the decisions from Utah demonstrates 
that appellant's contention is without merit. In State v. 
Masato Karumai, 101 U. 592, 126 P. 2d 1047 (1942), a 
series of admissions were obtained from the appellant while 
interrogated by a police officer, while in custody, without 
aid of counsel, without warning the accused of his rights, 
and where the accused was of Japanese descent and claimed 
difficulty in understanding English. Further, evidence 
clearly existed that showed the appellant, at least subse-
quent to the alleged crime, suffered from some mental 
illness. The court rejected a contention that this rendered 
the confe~sion involuntary, saying: 
"But even assuming this statement were a con-
fession and not merely an admission-as above 
concluded-still there was no showing that it was 
involuntarily made. The fact that the statement 
was made to an officer while under arrest does not 
make it involuntary. [Citing cases.] Nor is the 
fact that no warning was given defendant that what 
he said might be used against him conclusive, but 
all these facts and the circumstances existing at 
the time should be considered in determining the 
voluntary or involuntary character of the statement. 
[Citing cases.] The court, therefore, did not err in 
receiving this testimony in evidence." 
The Masato Karumai case is much more compelling in its 
plea for relief than the facts of the instant case, but since 
'Intensive analysis of cases from other states has not !been presented in this 
brief since the state contends Utah precedent is ample on this matter. But 
see A1bbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 568. 
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it clearly appeared that the accused's statement was with-
out coercion or duress, the court found no error. 
There was in this case no refusal of counsel or long in-
terrogation as was the case in State v. Braasch, 119 U. 450, 
229 P. 2d 289 (1951), wherein the court again upheld the 
propriety of the confession. The same standard was ac-
cepted in State v. Bridge, 3 U. 2d 281, 282 P. 2d 1043 
(1955) and State v. Ashdown, 5 U. 2d 59, 296 P. 726 
(1956), aff'd. Ashdown v. Utah, 357 U. S. 426. 
In State v. Nelson, 12 U. 2d 177, 364 P. 2d 409 (1961), 
the following contention was raised: 
"The defendant seeks reversal of his conviction 
on the ground that he was deprived of rights as-
sured him under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U. S. Constitution, and Sections 7 and 12 of Article 
I of the Utah Constitution, because he was taken 
into custody and kept in the presence of police offi-
cers and a magistrate and questioned concerning 
his conduct during the first two hours following the 
accident without being advised of his right to the 
aid of counsel, or that his statem~nts might be used 
against him." 
Again the facts of that case are more severe than those 
presented in the instant case; however, the court affirmed 
the use of the admissions against the accused, noting: 
"* * * There is no suggestion nor intima-
tion in the record that he ·was unwilling or even 
hesitant to talk to the Officer or to the Justice of 
the Peace, but he seems to have been voluble enough 
in conversing with them." 
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Under these circumstances, it can only be concluded 
that the appellant's complaint is not well taken. The facts 
disclosed here show no reluctance on the part of the appel-
lant to speak about his crime. When he first entered the 
office of the warden, he appeared to invite questions by 
asking (R. 242) : 
"Well, what are you going to ask me?" 
Nor could he even have been advised of his rights, for the 
record shows (R. 235): 
"Q. And did you at any time inform Mr. 
Ringo he had the right to be represented by counsel? 
"A. No, sir, I didn't have a chance to. 
"Q. But you didn't? 
"A. I just asked him what happened and he 
started talking." 
Further, no duress or coercion was used, and, finally, 
trial counsel failed to even join issue on the theory now 
claimed for reversal. 
This court has consistently said that it would not dis-
turb a jury's determination of the voluntariness of a con-
fession in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse. State 
v. Crank, supra; State v. Mares, 113 U. 225, 192 P. 2d 861 
(1948). Here the facts in no manner demonstrate such 
conduct that could be deemed violative of Article I, Section 
12 of the Utah Constitution. There is nothing in that arti-
cle requiring an accused be advised of his rights, or com-
pelled to have counsel present, or be interrogated other 
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than when he is in custody; quite to the contrary, it is com-
pulsion that is prohibited, and hence the question is one of 
voluntariness vs. involuntariness. A mechanical recitation 
of rights prior to interrogation would offer little comfort 
if a confession is otherwise involuntary and, on the other 
hand, the failure to advise or provide counsel is immaterial 
if a confession is otherwise voluntary. See Ritz, Twenty-
Five Years of State Criminal Confession Cases in the U. S. 
Supreme Court, 19 Washington & Lee Law Review 35, 39 
(1962). This court should refrain from a mechanical or 
formal attitude and approach the question purely from the 
view of: Was the confession voluntary? Such a rule al-
lows for flexibility and protects both the public and the 
individual. When applied in the instant case, it appears 
appellant's contention of a violation of constitutional rights 
is unmeritorious. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant has failed to show that he preserved 
his claim for appellate consideration and, further, that his 
claim has a proper constitutional foundation. This court 
should consequently affirm the conviction. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RONALD N. BOYCE, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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